INTRODUCTION
In a recent article, Hanushek and Taylor [1990] present a paradox in the existing literature on economics and schooling. Numerous education reports and reform efforts focus attention on state educational policies and make recommendations about changes in state policies. Yet there is a dearth of systematic evidence on the effectiveness of state policies in improving educational outcomes. There has been little empirical testing of whether policies adopted at the state level have any effect on the performance of students in schools within a state. In their article, Hanushek and Taylor provide a foundation for estimating the effects of state educational policies on student performance, but do not examine particular state policies.
Many studies have examined the effects of school and family on school performance. For example, Hanushek [1986] surveys 147 studies of education production functions. The inputs into the production of education typically include expenditures per pupil, pupil-teacher ratios, or teacher characteristics, and the output is some measure of student performance. Some production function studies have examined individual student variations in performance, while others have measured differences between schools or school districts. Virtually the only studies that have looked at state effects have been those attempting to measure trends in achievement scores [Congressionalgenerally not controlled for the broad range of inputs typical of the production function literature. None of the studies has explicitly examined policies adopted at the state level and their potential effects on student achievement.
A related set of studies has focused not on school achievement per se, but on the effects of schooling on subsequent labor market outcomes.1 Altonji [1988, 1989] examines the effects of the high school curriculum and both personal and community characteristics on wages and the rate of return to education, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class of 1972. Card and Krueger [1992] use data from the 1970 and 1980 censuses to estimate rates of return to education, by state, for men born between 1920 and 1949. Differences in rates of return across states and cohorts are in part explained by differences in pupil-teacher ratios, school term lengths, and characteristics of teachers.
Building on the framework developed by Hanushek and Taylor [1990], we incorporate state policy variables into our empirical analysis. While we include the inputs traditionally used in estimating education production functions, such as family and school characteristics, our main focus is on policy variables that differ at the state level. These policy variables can be viewed as mandatory inputs from the perspective of the schools. It is important to examine policy-driven inputs separately from those voluntarily chosen by the schools because, as we argue in the next section, their effects on student output may differ significantly.
In recent years, states have implemented various reforms in education policy, involving student or teacher testing, curriculum policies, and funding policies. For the most part, the recent implementation of these policies prohibits any systematic testing of their effects. One requirement, however, has been in place across states for a longer time:teacher certification. Because of its relatively long history and its variance both across states and over time, we examine the effect of state teacher certification requirements on SAT performance across the states from 1972 to 1990.
EXPECTED EFFECTS OF STATE POLICIES
Education has long remained under the jurisdiction of state and local governments; until recently, there has been very little involvement at the federal level. The result has been great diversity across states in the rules and regulations that govern schooling. The states' rules apply to a broad range of issues, including curriculum requirements, textbook selection, classroom size, expenditure levels, and tenure procedures; sometimes state rules may even specify the brands of equipment that can be purchased by local school districts.
While State policies regulating teacher certification have important ramifications for who will teach in the public schools, as well as for the measured effects of teacher training on educational output. By affecting the pool of teachers, certification policies can influence teacher quality and ultimately the quality of educational output. The effect of certification policies on schooling outcomes, however, has not been systematically examined.
Past studies that have examined teacher training effects on school output implicitly have assumed that training has differed across individuals, within and across schools, because teachers (and schools) have voluntarily chosen different education levels. Teachers who choose more education have been assumed to do so because of the increased knowledge it imparts; thus, enhanced returns to the teacher and the teacher's students are expected.
But consider the effects of a state requirement that teachers must have a master's degree to be certified. Because of the requirement, teachers will choose to pursue the degree not necessarily because they have a demand for increased knowledge or skills, but because it is a prerequisite to keeping their position.
There are different possible supply responses to this policy-driven demand. One possibility is that suppliers respond to some underlying demand for increased educational quality and provide a product that increases the knowledge of the teacher. Under these circumstances, the master's requirement would positively influence educational output.
An alternative supply response, however, would lead to either no effects on output or even negative effects. To illustrate the different possibilities, suppose the suppliers of the master's degree education respond to teachers who do not demand increased knowledge but merely demand certification. Under this scenario, the master's degree requires time inputs on the part of the elementary and secondary teacher, but does not result in real increased knowledge or skills that would affect a teacher's classroom performance. The result is no change in the quality of educational output.
In fact, this scenario could result in a decline in quality of schooling produced. If the master's degree is mere certification, it could have the effect of causing individuals with high opportunity costs to self-select out of the teaching profession entirely, because it raises the costs of pursuing a career in education without offering the reward of enhanced human capital. Under this scenario, the master's degree requirement serves primarily as a barrier to entry to the teaching profession that reduces both the quality of the pool of teachers and student achievement. 2 Conceptually, we conclude that the master's requirement may increase the quality of teachers and subsequent school output, may decrease the quality, or may have no effect at all. Ideally, we could test whether the master's requirement significantly affects teacher ability and school output. Lack of data by state prevents a test of the relationship between teacher quality and the certification requirement. Data at the national level and from individual universities do suggest that persons attracted to the teaching profession have lower standardized test scores than persons going into other fields, and some evidence suggests that the gap has widened over time.3 We devote the remainder of this article to exploring the empirical question of whether there is a significant relationship between the master's degree requirement and school output.
ACHIEVEMENT MEASURES
A first step in testing for an empirical relationship between teacher training requirements and quality of school output is some discussion of a measure of output quality or student achievement. Achievement is influenced by many factors outside the school environment, but many developed abilities-such as reading, writing, critical reasoning, analyzing, and learning certain facts-are generally considered academic-related skills. Measures of these skills necessarily reflect the influence of both home and student background, as well as that attributable to school.
There are many ways achievement might be measured. Grade point averages, for example, reveal information about a student's performance relative to others in that school. Grade point average, however, cannot be used for comparisons between schools or states, because of subjective biases and variations in grading policies within individual schools.4 Standardized exams, while imperfect, avoid these subjectivities and enable comparisons across a broader base, such as across states.
2 Similar arguments have been made for other state requirements, such as compulsory attendance laws for students. Compulsory attendance laws may increase time in school, and if the benefits of the additional time are greater than the costs, those students who would have dropped out are better off. Edwards [1978] finds that overall, compulsory schooling laws are not effective at increasing teenage enrollment rates. On the other hand, Angrist and Krueger [1990] find that compulsory attendance laws are effective at increasing attendance and increase the earnings of those who are compelled to attend for a longer period. However, they do not examine the costs of compulsory schooling laws, either to the individual student or to others. Compulsory schooling laws have external effects in that requiring the poorest quality students to stay in school detracts from teachers' efforts to improve the quality of teaching for the other, better students. 3Studies of student performance on SAT, ACT, and GRE exams, by major, consistently find students majoring in education scoring below those of other disciplines. ACT scores for collegebound seniors, for example, show that education majors' scores fell relative to the average graduate throughout the 1970s. Scores on the SAT reveal the same pattern. In 1973, the mean SAT score for an education major was 54 points below that of other intended majors. In 1982, the difference was 80 points [Schlechty and Vance, 1983] . A National Longitudinal Study sample of college seniors in 1976 found that education majors ranked 14th out of 16 fields on SAT verbal scores and 15th out of 16 in math scores [Weaver, 1983 [Weaver, , 1978 Beyond objective empirical evidence relating SAT scores and achievement, SATs are also important because of their visibility and public perception. Chubb and Moe [1990, pp. 7-8] argue that the decline in SAT scores from the mid-1960s to the 1980s has been the "single most important symbol" of widespread dissatisfaction with the American public school system. The concern over declining SATs is based on real effects. Bishop [1989] , for example, finds evidence that falling achievement, reflected through SAT scores, was a significant factor in explaining decreases in productivity growth in the U.S. during the 1980s and 1990s. In summary, given evidence that SAT scores proxy school achievement, that the public perceives SATs as an indicator of quality, and that SATs have been shown to be related to real changes in productivity, we choose SAT scores as our empirical measure of school quality or student achievement.
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA
Hanushek and Taylor [1990] posit a model of individual student performance in which achievement is determined by the level of current and past family and school resources, individual-specific unobservables, and a random component that varies over individuals and time. We adopt a similar model, in which the average achievement in a given state for a given year is determined by current and past school variables, including state policy variables, current and past family variables, and various other control variables to take into account location effects, year effects, and possible nonrandom test participation or selection bias. More explicitly, our model of average student achievement by state and year can be written As a test for robustness, we also estimated the model using first differences and different weighting schemes for past values of the independent variables (e.g., geometrically declining weights). Because the results are qualitatively unchanged across specification, we present only the results from the model above. The definitions and means of all the variables used in the estimation are given in Table 1 Dynarski [1987] in constructing a measure to control for this variation. Our other participation variable is an indicator that shows whether most of the college-bound students in the state take the ACT exam.
The use of SAT scores and aggregate state data poses a number of problems, as pointed out by Hanushek and Taylor [1990] . We have taken steps to address each of these problems in our empirical model. The first problem they point to is that family data are often missing from the analysis. Our model includes a set of family variables controlling for income, schooling, and family size and race. The second problem is that typically, aggregate studies do not include time-varying school inputs. Our model includes state policy, school, and family variables that incorporate variation over the previous 12 years. Thus, the entire time period for which the SAT test takers were in school is taken into account. The third problem pointed out by Hanushek and Taylor is that there is typically measurement error in school inputs. Their specific example is that SAT scores include both students from public and private schools, and that public school information may not be relevant for private school students. In order to account for this problem, we include a variable measuring the proportion of students in private schools over the 12 years prior to the SAT data. Lastly, Hanushek and Taylor point out that nonrandom test taking is a potential problem, given the wide variation in test participation rates across states. We control for this type of selection bias, employing the same method as Dynarski [1987] . Hanushek and Taylor state that the Dynarski method is preferable to the alternative of directly adjusting SAT scores based on demographic information. Table 2 presents regression results using three alternative SAT measures: SATVM, SATV, and SATM. The models are estimated using SAT data for the 50 states for the years 1972, 1978, 1984, and 1990 .' SATVM is the combined verbal and math SAT average score by state for the years 1972, 1978, 1984, and 1990 . SATV is the average verbal score by state and year, and SATM is the average math score.
RESULTS
The most important result for this study is that states with a master's degree requirement for certification have significantly lower SAT scores. This Finally, we have also controlled for selection bias using a variable similar to the one used by Dynarski [1987] . Our P variable is the log of the proportion of high school graduates who take the SAT exam by state and year. As the proportion of graduates who take the SAT exam increases, the average score in the state significantly decreases. This variable controls for differences in participation probabilities across states and over time, an important source of selection bias. Following Dynarski [1987] , we tried different functional forms for the P variable, such as a quadratic and a logistic transformation, as well as including the variable linearly. The logarithmic transformation provided the best fit of the data. Once we control for differences in test participation across states and over time, SAT scores are not significantly different in states in which students primarily take the ACT exam.
As discussed earlier, the negative finding on the MASTER variable is not sensitive to the functional form of the model. We also estimated the model with different combinations of independent variables and different samples of data, for example, over more limited time periods, and for each of the individual years. Qualitatively similar results to those reported in Table 2 were found.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Many studies examining education production functions have concluded that increased expenditures do not result in higher quality output for schools. The evidence suggests that the answer to declining educational achievement is not increasing dollars for schools. This article reaches a similar conclusion about teacher certification requirements. Our results suggest that requiring a master's degree for teacher certification does not increase the quality of teacher inputs; instead it actually decreases the performance of students when measured by SAT scores.
These findings represent a first effort to measure the effect of teacher training rules on student achievement. Although the data set in this article covered a time span from 1972 to 1990, it included only four years of measured achievement. Future research should examine data covering different years and, ideally, should look at individual students across different states with various teacher training requirements. The finding of a negative relationship between teacher training requirements and student achievement should serve as an impetus for increased attention to this issue by both academics and policymakers.
